I. INTRODUCTION
In the Bitcoin white paper [1] , Nakamoto proposed a very simple Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm that is also known as Nakamoto consensus. Despite its simplicity, some existing analysis of Nakamoto consensus appears to be long and involved. In this technical report, we aim to make such analysis simple and transparent so that we can teach senior undergraduate students and graduate students in our institutions. This report is largely based on a 3-hour tutorial given by one of the authors in June 2019 [2] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We closely follow the notations in [3] . Let N denote the set of participating nodes in the network. Each node n ∈ N has p n fraction of total hashing power so that it mines new blocks at a rate of p n f blocks per second, where f is the total mining rate. 1 There are two types of nodes: honest nodes who strictly follow the protocol and adversarial nodes who may deviate from the protocol. The set of honest nodes (resp., adversarial nodes) is denoted by H (resp., Z). The adversarial nodes control β fraction of total hashing power, i.e., n∈Z p n = β. The honest nodes control 1 − β fraction of total hashing power, i.e., n∈H p n = 1 − β. If a block is mined by an honest node (resp., adversarial node), we call it an honest block (resp., adversarial block). A block's height is its parent block's height plus one. (The height of the genesis block is set to 0.) Mining at each node n ∈ N is modeled by a Poisson process with rate p n f as done in the Bitcoin white paper.
Hence, the aggregated mining process of the honest nodes (resp., adversarial nodes) is a Poisson process with rate (1 − β)f (resp., βf ). Without loss of generality, we can assume a single adversarial node with β fraction of hashing power, and we call this node the adversary.
We assume a bounded network delay of ∆ seconds for honest nodes. That is, whenever an honest node mines a new block, it takes up to ∆ seconds for the block to reach all other honest nodes. We assume a zero delay from honest nodes to the adversary. That is, whenever an honest node mines a new block, the adversary receives it immediately. These assumptions make the adversary even more powerful in terms of network communication.
Next, we discretize the above continuous-time model into a discrete-time model in a way that generalizes the discretization procedure in [3] . We divide ∆ seconds into τ rounds so that each round in our model corresponds [3] . On the other hand, when τ → ∞, our model approaches the continuous-time model in [4] . In this sense, our model provides a unified treatment.
Following [3] , [5] , [6] , we assume that blocks can only be mined at the beginning of each round. That is, if new blocks are mined in round r with the interval [r ∆ τ , (r + 1) ∆ τ ), we will set their generation time to be the beginning of round r (i.e., r ∆ τ ). Note that such an approximation tends to be accurate as τ → ∞. honest blocks mined at the beginning of round r will reach all the honest nodes in the network by the end of round r + τ − 1, since it takes τ rounds to broadcast any honest block. On the other hand, the Z[r] adversarial blocks can be kept in private until the adversary decides to transmit any of them in later rounds. Once transmitted, any adversarial block will reach all the honest nodes within τ rounds. 2 Under the above system model, Nakamoto consensus can be described as follows.
• At each round r, an honest node attempts to mine new blocks on top of the longest chain it observes by the end of round r − 1 (where ties can be broken arbitrarily). This is often referred to as the longest chain rule.
• At each round r, an honest node confirms a block if the longest chain it adopts contains the block as well as at least k other blocks of larger heights. This is sometimes referred to as the k-deep confirmation rule.
Next, let us make an observation that will be used in our analysis later.
Lemma 1:
If an honest block of height ℓ is mined at the beginning of round r, then every honest node observes a chain of length at least ℓ by the end of round r + τ − 1.
Proof: First, this honest block will reach all the honest nodes by the end of round r + τ − 1 as we discussed before. Second, its parent block (no matter honest or adversarial) will reach all the honest nodes by the end of round r + τ − 1. This argument applies to all of its ancestor blocks. Hence, by the end of round r + τ − 1, every honest node will observe a chain consisting of this block, its ancestor blocks, as well as new (honest or adversarial) blocks mined on top of this block. If there are no such new blocks, the chain length is ℓ. Otherwise, the chain length is greater than ℓ.
III. EFFECTIVE ROUNDS AND LIVENESS
A round r is called an effective round (ER) if there is some honest block mined in round r and there is no honest block mined in the previous τ − 1 rounds. By effective, we mean two things: 1) at least one honest block is successfully mined in round r and 2) the longest chain (among all the honest nodes) will be increased. When 
Lemma 2: Honest blocks mined in distinct ERs have different heights.
Proof: Suppose for contradiction that two honest blocks B and B ′ of height ℓ are mined in round r and r ′ respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that r < r ′ . We have r ′ ≥ r + τ , because otherwise r ′ cannot be an ER. By Lemma 1, every honest node observes a chain of length at least ℓ by the end of round r ′ − 1 (or even earlier). Therefore, no honest node will mine a new block B ′ of height ℓ in round r ′ .
Next, we introduce an indicator random variable X[r] for whether round r is an ER, i.e., X[r] = 1 when round r is an ER and X[r] = 0 otherwise. Note that Pr(X 
In a time interval of s consecutive rounds, the expected number of ERs is at least γs.
Proof: The number of ERs in a time interval of s consecutive rounds starting from round r is given by
where the equality holds when r ≥ τ .
Lemma 4: For any positive integer m, in a time interval of τ m consecutive rounds starting from round r, the number of ERs has the following Chernoff-type bound: For 0 < δ < 1,
By (a slightly modified version of) Lemma 3, we have E X (j) ≥ γm. Proof: First, by Lemma 1, every honest node observes a chain of length at least ℓ at the beginning of round r + τ . Next, consider a time interval of τ m consecutive rounds starting from round r + τ . By Lemma 4, we have at least (1 − δ)γτ m ERs from round r + τ to round r + τ + τ m − 1, except for e −Ω(δ 2 γm) probability. We take one honest block from each ER. By Lemma 2, these honest blocks have different heights, all greater than ℓ. In particular, the largest height of these blocks is at least ℓ + (1 − δ)γτ m. By Lemma 1, at the beginning of round r + 2τ + τ m − 1, every honest node observes a chain of length at least ℓ + (1 − δ)γτ m. . Finally, by setting δ Z = δ X = δ/4
and noticing 1+δ/4 1−δ/4 < 1 + δ, we have
except for e −Ω(δ 2 min{βf ∆,γ}m) probability.
Finally, we would like to point out that chain growth and chain quality-when putting together-imply livenss, which states that every valid transaction will be eventually confirmed by honest nodes with high probability.
IV. UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE ROUNDS AND SAFETY
A round r is called a uniquely effective round (UER) if there is exactly one honest block mined in round r, and there is no honest block mined in the previous and next τ − 1 rounds. By uniquely effective, we mean two things: 
. In a time interval of s consecutive rounds, the expected number of UERs is at least ηs.
Proof: The number of UERs in a time interval of s consecutive rounds starting from round r is given by
Lemma 7: For any positive integer m, in a time interval of (2τ − 1)m consecutive rounds starting from round r, the number of UERs has the following Chernoff-type bound: For 0 < δ < 1,
random variables. By (a slightly modified version of) Lemma 6, we have E Y (j) ≥ ηm. By Lemma 10, we have
In a time interval of (2τ − 1)m consecutive rounds starting from round r, the number of UERs is greater than the number of adversarial blocks except for e −Ω(δ 2 min{η,βf ∆}m) probability. 
. This implies β < 0.5. When τ = 1, the condition says f ∆ < Proof: Consider the event E that "B and B ′ of the same height are both confirmed, each by an honest node."
We will show that this event happens with probability at most e −Ω(δ 2 min{ η f ∆ ,β}k) , regardless of adversarial action.
Let r (resp., r ′ ) be the smallest round at the beginning of which B (resp., B ′ ) is confirmed. (by some honest node) at the beginning of round r 0 . For convenience, we assume that the genesis block is mined at the beginning of round 0. This makes r 0 well defined. We next define the following two events:
• E 1 (r 0 , r): At the beginning of round r, there are two disjoint subchains mined on top of B 1 , each containing at least k + 1 blocks mined from round r 0 to round r;
We will show that E ⊆ E 1 (r 0 , r) ⊆ E 2 (r 0 , r), regardless of adversarial action. By (a slightly modified version of) Lemma 8, for any given r 0 and r, we have
Pr(E 2 (r 0 , r)) ≤ e −Ω(δ 2 min{η,βf ∆} r−r 0 +1 2τ −1 ) .
Finally, we will bound r − r 0 and complete the proof. We claim that
except for e −Ω(δ 2 k) probability, regardless of adversarial action. To see this, recall that E 1 (r 0 , r) states that two subchains contain at least 2k + 2 blocks. Hence, r − r 0 + 1 is smallest if all the mined blocks from round r 0 to round r (the number of which is H[r 0 , r] + Z[r 0 , r]) belong to these two subchains. By Lemma 11,
So, if we set r − r 0 + 1 = 2k+2
(1+δ)f ∆ τ , then we have
This proves our claim.
Define the event D as r − r 0 + 1 > 2k+2
Therefore, for any adversarial action, we have
where the last inequality follows from k ≥ min{ η f ∆ , β}k. Finally, we would like to point out that our safety property stated in Theorem 3 is equivalent to the common-prefix property in the previous analysis, such as [3] , [5] .
V. DISCUSSION
The analysis of Nakamoto consensus was started by Garay, Kiayias and Leonardos in their landmark work [5] , which was later refined by Bagaria et. al. [3] in the context of parallel chains. Both papers only considered the case of τ = 1. The extension to the case of τ > 1 was presented by Pass, Seeman and shelat 3 [6] , which was later refined by Kiffer, Rajaraman and shelat [7] as well as Zhao [8] via Markov chain analysis. Our analysis is simpler and more transparent than the previous analysis in that it introduces two events E 1 (r 0 , r) and E 2 (r 0 , r) explicitly and avoids the use of Markov chains.
At the final stage of completing this report, we notice an independent work by Ling Ren [4] , which focuses on a continuous-time model instead of a discrete-time model. His elegant analysis can be viewed as a counterpart of our analysis. For instance, his safety condition g 2 α > (1 + δ)β is as tight as our safety condition η > (1 + δ)βf ∆ τ as τ → ∞. 4 We will leave it for future work to carefully compare his analysis with ours. Lemma 10 (Chernoff bound for a sum of dependent random variables): Let T be a positive integer. Let X (j) = n−1 i=0 X j+iT be the sum of n independent indicator random variables and µ j = E X (j) for j ∈ {1, . . . , T }. Let X = X (1) + · · · + X (T ) . Let µ = min j {µ j }. Then, for 0 < δ < 1, Pr (X ≤ (1 − δ)µT ) ≤ e −δ 2 µ/2 .
Proof: LetX = X T = 1 T T j=1 X (j) . Then, for any t < 0, we have
Note that exp(·) is a convex function, we use Jensen's inequality to obtain E(e tX ) ≤ 1 T T j=1 E e tX (j) . Hence,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that µ j ≥ µ for all j. Setting t = ln(1 − δ) < 0 and following the footsteps in the proof of Theorem 4.5 in [9], we have E e tX (j) e t(1−δ)µ j ≤ e −δ 2 µj /2 for all j. Finally, we note that e −δ 2 µj /2 ≤ e −δ 2 µ/2 for all j and this completes the proof.
Lemma 11 (Chernoff bounds for Poisson random variables): Let X be a Poisson random variable with mean µ.
Then, for 0 < δ < 1, Pr (X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e −δ 2 µ/3 . Proof: For any t > 0, we have Pr (X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) = Pr e tX ≥ e t(1+δ)µ ≤ E(e tX ) e t(1+δ)µ .
Since E(e tX ) = e (e t −1)µ for a Poisson random varaible, we have
Pr (X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e (e t −1)µ e t(1+δ)µ .
Setting t = ln(1 + δ) > 0, we have
Finally, note that e δ
